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Articles
Rethinking Consideration in the Electronic Age
ROBERT A. HILLMAN* AND MAUREEN A. O'ROURKE**
Our fast-paced age of electronic agreements that ostensibly govern transactions as
diverse as downloading software, ordering goods, and engaging in collaborative
development projects raises questions regarding the suitability of contract law as the
appropriate legal framework. While this question arises in many settings, we focus here
on the free and open source software (FOSS) movement because of the maturity and
success of its model and the ubiquity of its software. We explore in particular whether
open source licenses are supported by consideration, and argue that they are, and that
open source licenses are contracts. We further argue that a contractual framework
working in tandem with the intellectual property laws is the appropriate legal structure
to govern FOSS transactions. Our discussion holds implications for the understanding
of consideration doctrine and contract law generally outside of the FOSS example and,
indeed, for collaborative development and electronic agreements generally. The Article
is thus an exercise in understanding consideration doctrine's past and future.
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INTRODUCTION
The age of electronic communication and digital products creates
new challenges for contract law. Novel methods of doing business and
new kinds of products raise substantial issues of contract formation,
enforcement, and remedy. Because of the importance to our economy of
the industries involved, perhaps no other set of commercial legal issues
requires greater attention.'
Indeed, one important set of issues is whether some transactions
are, or should be, encompassed within a contractual framework at all.2
I. See, e.g., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SERVICE ANNUAL SURVEY 2005, at
29-30 tbl. 3.1.6 (2007), available at http://www2.census.gov/services/sas/data/Historical/sas-o5.pdf
(listing the operating revenue of the United States software industry as over $119 billion in 2005).
2. Compare Jos6 J. Gonzalez de Alaiza Cardona, Open Source, Free Software, and Contractual
Issues, 15 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 157, 185-209 (2007) (arguing generally that the Free Software
Foundation's (FSF's) General Public License (GPL) is a contract), with Sapna Kumar, Enforcing the
GNU GPL, I J.L. TECH. & POL'Y I, I6 (2oo6) (arguing that the GPL lacks consideration and should be
"properly characterized as a failed contract"). For discussions of related issues, see Michael J.
Madison, Reconstructing the Software License, 35 Lov. U. CHI. L.J. 275 (2003) (evaluating different
software licensing regimes and their effectiveness); David McGowan, Legal Implications of Open
Source Software, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 241 (analyzing the GNU/Linux system and the organization of
the open-source community); Daniel B. Ravicher, Facilitating Collaborative Software Development:
The Enforceability of Mass-Market Public Software Licenses, 5 VA. J.L. & TECH. II (2000), http://
www.vjolt.net/vol5/issue3/V5i3ai i-Ravicher.html (exploring the history of software licensing and
current law); Greg R. Vetter, "Infectious" Open Source Software: Spreading Incentives or Promoting
Resistance?, 36 RUTGERs L.J. 53 (2004) (examining infectious license terms of expansive scope and the
incentives such terms create for open source and proprietary software); Jason B. Wacha, Taking the
Case: Is the GPL Enforceable?, 2! SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECu. L.J. 45! (2005) (arguing that
the GPL is an enforceable agreement).
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For example, what is the appropriate legal framework to govern the
licensing of open source software that is collaboratively developed and
powers ever-more machines? 3 Steven Weber aptly captures the nature of
the open source software movement:
Open source collaboration depends on an explicit intellectual property
regime, codified in a series of licenses. It is, however, a regime built
around a set of assumptions and goals that are different from those of
mainstream intellectual property rights thinking. The principal goal of
the open source intellectual property regime is to maximize the
ongoing use, growth, development, and distribution of free software.
To achieve that goal, this regime shifts the fundamental optic of
intellectual property rights away from protecting the prerogatives of an
author toward protecting the prerogatives of generations of users.4
Although there are many different open source licenses, the
General Public License (GPL) is likely the most common.5 To achieve
the goal of creating a software commons, the GPL authorizes
copyholders to transfer, copy, or modify the software subject to a series
of restrictions. The restrictions are designed to further an environment of
openness by requiring copyholders to reveal the source code to
transferees of any software products that are derived from the original
source code (often referred to as the "copyleft" provision)' and to
3. For a discussion of the nature of source code, see Jyh-An Lee, New Perspectives on Public
Goods Production: Policy Implications of Open Source Software, 9 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 45, 49
(2006).
Software developers write software in various programming languages . ... The original
format they write is called source code, which is easy for trained programmers to read and
understand. This source code has to be compiled or translated into an object code . . . before
it can be processed by a computer.... Source code enables users to extend or modify the
software for their own needs, while object code is understood only by computers.
"Open source software" is software, the source and object code of which are distributed
and made available to the public allowing for free modification by other programmers. In
contrast, most commercial software is proprietary software, and is distributed only with the
object code so that competitors are prevented from reusing the source code to develop the
software.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
4. STEVEN WEBER, THE SUCCESS OF OPEN SOURCE 84 (2004).
5. See Stephen J. Davidson & Nathan Kumagai, Developments in the Open Source Community
and the Impact of the Release of GPLv3, in OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE 2007: RISKs, REWARDS, AND
PRACTICAL REALITIES IN THE CORPORATE ENVIRONMENT 137 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, &
Literary Prop., Course Handbook Series No. 11418, 2007) ("[T]he GPL license covers a solid majority
of open source software. According to one source, around two-thirds of all open source projects use
the GPL."); Kumar, supra note 2, at i, 3 & n.14 ("Between sixty-five and seventy percent of open
source software is GPL[Version 2]-licensed.").
6. See generally Ira V. Heffan, Note, Copyleft: Licensing Collaborative Works in the Digital Age,
49 STAN. L. REV. 1487 ('997) (reviewing shrinkwrap cases, exploring the implementation of copyleft
under GNU GPL, and examining the similarities between copyleft, shrinkwrap, and shareware license
agreements).
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transfer such software under the same terms as the GPL ("same terms"
provision), making the terms themselves "viral" in nature.
Historically, some open source vendors and enthusiasts insisted that
such arrangements were merely limited licenses to use the software and
were not contracts in large part because they do not require acceptance
of the terms8 nor require the copyholder to furnish consideration to
support the grant of use.' If the user violated the restrictions in the
license, licensors could seek redress in an intellectual property
infringement proceeding, but not for breach of contract. The advantages
of this legal framework perceived by these advocates include the absence
of worrisome formation, liability, privity, and remedial rules of contract
law and the availability of injunctive relief under intellectual property
law.'0 Perhaps even more important, open source visionaries believe their
arrangements create a new framework of sharing and openness that is
impervious to, and on a higher plane than, contract law." On the other
hand, others maintain - although without much analysis - that the typical
open source license, such as the GPL, constitutes a contract because of
the nature of the restrictions and other provisions in the license. 2
In this Article, we focus on the consideration issue and show in
some detail that open source licenses that contain restrictions, such as the
copyleft and the "same terms" restrictions described above, do not lack
consideration, and are therefore not precluded from treatment as
contracts on that ground.'3 More important, we assert that contract law
should govern these transactions because contract law best facilitates the
goals of the open source movement while at the same time protecting the
interests of open source end users. Indeed, contract working with
copyright law better enables the open source movement to realize its
goals than reliance on copyright law alone.
But as the title to this Article suggests, we have another important
goal beyond analyzing the legal framework of the open source
movement. This Article illuminates the meaning and role of the
consideration doctrine as we move from a paper to an electronic world.
7. wEBER, supra note 4, at 49.
8. For example, the GNU GPL states that the copyholder is "not required to accept this License
in order to receive or run a copy of the Program." Free Software Found., GNU General Public
License, Version 3 (June 2007), http://www.fsf.org/licensing/licenses/gpl.html [hereinafter GNU
Version 31.
9. See, e.g., Eben Moglen, Enforcing the GPL, I, LINUXUSER MAG., Aug. 2oo, available at http:f/
emoglen.law.columbia.edu/publications/lu-12.html. We focus on the consideration issue here, but set
forth our view of formation below. See infra notes I14-18 and accompanying text.
1o. See infra notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
i i. See WEBER, supra note 4.
12. See infra note 96-I 18, and accompanying text for our view on the issue.
13. Other terms that constitute consideration, according to advocates of the contract model,
include those that require the licensee to waive any infringement claim or breach of warranty
complaint. See, e.g., Gonz~lez de Alaiza Cardona, supra note 2, at 204-06.
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Consideration doctrine has always been something of a mystery and
working out how it does or does not apply in the open source software
setting increases our understanding of how the principle has served, and
should continue to serve society. The Article is thus an exercise in
understanding where consideration doctrine has been and where it is
going.
We demonstrate that the purpose of consideration doctrine is to
enforce promises that benefit society (viewed broadly) and that are
capable of judicial administration. Under this pragmatic framework,
open source software transactions can and should be administered as
contracts because of their economic importance and because of the
judiciary's ability to administer them. Further, because contract law
clarifies formation requirements, quality obligations, and remedial duties
of open source transactions, and generally increases transactional
certainty, both providers and end users of open source software have an
interest in establishing a contractual framework for their transactions.
These conclusions have implications beyond the software industry and
shed light on the appropriate legal landscape for other movements
employing the philosophy of openness.
Part I constitutes a brief primer on the bargain theory of
consideration as courts apply it in the paper world. Part II discusses the
open source software movement and concludes that open source licenses
are contracts under an appropriate understanding of consideration
doctrine. Part III makes the normative argument that a contract-based
framework makes sense for the open source community. Our conclusion
reiterates our view that contract law, working with intellectual property
law, is the appropriate legal structure to govern most open source
software transactions.
I. THE BARGAIN THEORY OF CONSIDERATION
A. THE MEANING OF "BARGAIN"
As discussed above, an important issue in the electronic age is
whether, as a descriptive matter, an open source software license, such as
the GPL, constitutes a contract. The issue focuses in large part on
whether consideration supports the distribution of the open source
software or, on the other hand, whether the license amounts to no more
than a "bare license" or gift with restrictions. So we start with a brief
primer on the consideration doctrine under traditional contract law.14
14. Part I is based on ROBERT A. HILLMAN, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 15-37 (2004).
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i. Definitions
In a nutshell, contract law enforces promises if the promise is part of
a "bargained-for exchange" or "bargain."" A bargain exists if the
promisor extracts something from the promisee in exchange for the
promise." This price of the promise is called "consideration."" Contract
law distinguishes a promise supported by consideration from a gift
promise, which is not enforceable.'
The following example illustrates this distinction:
Suppose a "benevolent" person, Ron D. Jockefeller, promises to buy
clothes for a homeless person if the homeless person walks to a
clothing store a few blocks away. If the homeless person walks to the
store, is Jockefeller's promise of the clothes enforceable? Only if
Jockefeller bargained for the homeless person to walk to the store,
which in turn depends on whether Jockefeller's motive was to extract
the walk as the price of the promise of clothes. But in order to
understand Jockefeller's motive, we need more facts. Suppose
Jockefeller owned a restaurant and the homeless person had camped
out in front of the restaurant. These facts support a finding that
Jockefeller's motive for his promise was to remove the homeless
person from the vicinity of the restaurant and we can therefore say that
Jockefeller bargained for the homeless person's walk to the clothing
store. But if Jockefeller did not own a restaurant and made the
promise, not because he would get something in return, but simply
because he is a wonderful person, the promise would constitute a gift
promise and would be unenforceable. The homeless person still must
walk to the store to pick up the gift. But those in the know say that the
trip to the store is a condition necessary to pick up a gift, not
consideration to support Jockefeller's promise.' 9
Of course, distinguishing a condition of a gift from consideration
often is no small challenge. In Judge Cardozo's famous decision in
Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank, for example,
Mary Yates Johnston promised Allegheny College $5ooo to establish the
"Mary Yates Johnston memorial fund." 20 After contributing $iooo,
Johnston repudiated her promise, which led to a lawsuit by the college.2
Judge Cardozo held that the college assumed a duty "to perpetuate the
name of the founder of the memorial," which was "sufficient in itself to
give validity to the subscription within the rules that define consideration
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 16 (footnote omitted); see also Plowman v. Indian Ref. Co., 20 F. Supp. I, 5 (E.D. Ill.
1937) (employees' obligation to visit employer's office to pick up checks merely a condition for a gift).
This example was inspired by a similar problem posed by Williston in ISAMUEL wILLISrON. THE LAW
oF CONTRACTS 232-33 (1924).
20. 159 N.E. 173, 174 (N.Y. 1927).
2 1. Id.
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for a promise of that order."" However, the dissent argued that "[t]he
sum offered was termed a 'gift' by [Johnston]. Consequently, I can see no
reason why we should strain ourselves to make it, not a gift, but a
trade."23 In short, the majority and dissent disagreed over Johnston's
motive-was the use of her name the price of her promise or did she
simply want to make a gift, with the suggestion that the college use her
name? Both interpretations seem reasonable.
By drawing on the murky gift-versus-consideration distinction,
contract law leaves plenty of room for courts to decide whether to
enforce promises for other reasons. In short, Cardozo's conclusion likely
was motivated more by his sense of the importance of facilitating
charitable donations than on the strictures of consideration doctrine.
2. More on the Promisor's Motive
So far, the discussion illustrates that traditional contract law's
"bargain" concept focuses on the promisor's motive for making the
promise and that this determination is often a challenge. Adding further
to the confusion, the promisor's actual motive does not control, but what
a reasonable person with knowledge of the circumstances would believe
is the promisor's motive.24 This is consistent with contract law's general
focus on the apparent rather than subjective meaning of the parties'
language in negotiating and forming their contract.25 Another wrinkle is
that a promisor's motive to extract something from the promisee can be
very minor among a host of reasons for making the promise (as
determined objectively) and that motive can change over time.26
Receiving something in return "does not have to be the primary or even
a substantial reason for making the promise, it simply has to be one of
the reasons."" This maneuver, of course, affords courts even more
leeway to manipulate consideration doctrine and to decide on other
grounds.
B. WHY NOT ENFORCE Givr PROMISES?
Theorists have spilled a great deal of ink trying to understand why
contract law generally enforces bargains but not gift promises.28 Why is
22. Id. at 176.
23. Id. at 177 (Kellogg, J., dissenting).
24. See WILLISTON, supra note 19, at 232; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 81 cmt.
a (1981) ("[T]he promisor must manifest an intention to induce the performance or return promise and
to be induced by it, and ... the promisee must manifest an intention to induce the making of the
promise and to be induced by it." (emphasis added)).
25. HILLMAN, supra note IS, at 37-40.
26. Id. at I8.
27. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 8I(I) ("The fact that what is bargained
for does not of itself induce the making of a promise does not prevent it from being consideration for
the promise." (emphasis added)); supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
28. See HILLMAN, supra note i5, at 23-25.
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my "bargain" to sell my piano to Alice in exchange for $4oo enforceable,
but my promise to give Alice my piano is not? 29 Before enforcing a
promise, why bother to determine whether one of a potential host of
reasons for making a promise, viewed objectively, was to extract
something from the promisee?
Contract law analysts have offered many disparate answers to this
question.30 Professor Lon Fuller's set of explanations3' is perhaps the
most prominent, arguably the most persuasive, and although sometimes
recast in different terminology, the most repeated." Nevertheless, even
Fuller's reasons leave much open to debate.
In his 1941 article Consideration and Form, Professor Fuller
presented what he called "formal" and "substantive" reasons for
enforcing promises supported by consideration, but not gift promises." In
the "formal" reason category, Fuller thought that, as a general matter,
promises supported by consideration generate more evidence than gift
promises that a promisor actually made the promise.34 Enforcing only
bargains thus satisfies "[t]he need for evidentiary security."35 Of course,
contract law also could have enforced written gift promises, which would
have satisfied Fuller's "evidentiary function." The evidentiary role of
consideration therefore cannot constitute a sufficient explanation for
enforcing bargains and not gift promises.
Fuller explained further that people take their bargains more
seriously than gift promises." He reasoned that people often make gift
promises impulsively or improvidently. 37 As with Fuller's "evidentiary"
29. For further obfuscation, see the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAcas § 71 cmt. c.
[A] gift is not ordinarily treated as a bargain, and a promise to make a gift is not made a
bargain by the promise of the prospective donee to accept the gift, or by his acceptance of
part of it. This may be true even though the terms of gift impose a burden on the donee as well
as the donor.
Id. (emphasis added). The best explanation for this language is that some burdens constitute only what
is necessary to complete a gift. For example, a donee who must travel to a store to receive a gift
experiences the burden of the travel, but the travel ordinarily would not constitute consideration. See
supra Part I.A.
30. HILLMAN, supra note 15, at 23-25.
31. Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1941).
32. See, e.g., Baehr v. Penn-O-Tex Oil Corp., 104 N.W.2d 661 (Minn. 1960).
33. Fuller, supra note 31.
34. See id. at 799-800.
35. Id. at 8oo; see also Mark B. Wessman, Retraining the Gatekeeper: Further Reflections on the
Doctrine of Consideration, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 713, 829 (1996) (noting that the requirement of a
bargain avoids enforcement of "too easily fabricated" gift promises).
36. Fuller, supra note 31, at 816-17 ("[T]he fact that the transaction is an exchange and not a
gift .. . does offer some guaranty so far as the cautionary and channeling functions of form are
concerned .. "(footnote omitted)).
37. In the famous case of Dougherty v. Salt, 125 N.E. 94, 94 (N.Y. 1919), Helena Dougherty
promised her nephew. Charlie, $3000 because she wanted to "take care' of him. The facts reveal that.
before Helena's promise, Charlie's guardian told Helena not to "take . . . out in talk" her appreciation
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function, however, the "cautionary" role of consideration cannot fully
explain the bargain requirement. Enforcing written gift promises
arguably also would serve the same purpose because most people believe
that written promises are more important and serious." In fact, many
people probably believe such promises are already legally enforceable.39
Fuller also set forth "substantive" explanations for the gift-
consideration division that concern "the significance of the promise
made and not merely the circumstances surrounding the making of it." 40
For example, Fuller thought that enforcing bargains enhances "private
autonomy."4 ' According to Fuller, "the law views private individuals as
possessing a power to effect ... changes in their legal relations" every bit
as effective as a legislature.42 In addition, people can rely on their
bargains with the knowledge that contract law will enforce them.
Further, where one party has relied in a manner that benefits the
promisor, the reason for enforcing promises is strongest because one
party's detrimental reliance results in the other's unjust enrichment.43
Fuller's substantive reasons for enforcing bargains thus far are of
limited help in explaining why contract law enforces bargains but not gift
promises." For example, contract law could enforce gift promises to
facilitate people's freedom to make and receive gifts.45 Private autonomy
therefore cannot be the primary reason for the distinction between gifts
and bargains. Fuller's reliance and unjust enrichment arguments also fail
to explain very well why contract law enforces bargains even if the
promisee has not relied or conferred a benefit on the promisor. 6
for her nephew. Id. The court therefore declined to enforce Helena's promise because she was goaded
into it. Id. at 95; see also Wessman, supra note 35, at 835 (positing that enforcing gift promises would
lead to "inadvertent contracting").
38. HILLMAN, supra note 15, at 24.
39. Fuller also discussed the "channeling" function of consideration. See Fuller, supra note 31, at
8o-13. In a nutshell, a bargain presents parties with a concrete procedure or a "distinct set of
instructions" for creating an enforceable obligation. HILLMAN, supra note 15, at 24. Gift promises,
according to Fuller, are "too amorphous to constitute clear instructions for creating a legal obligation."
See Fuller, supra note 31, at 815 ("As to the channeling function of form. ... the [gift] promise is made
in a field where intention is not naturally canalized. There is nothing. .,. to effect a neat division
between tentative and exploratory expressions of intention, on the one hand, and legally effective
transactions, on the other."). But again, written gift promises would do much of the same "channeling"
work as a bargain.
40. Fuller, supra note 31, at 799-800.
41. Id. at8o6-o8.
42. Id. at8o6-07.
43. Id at 815-16.
44. See Mark B. Wessman, Recent Defenses of Consideration: Commodification and
Collaboration, 41 IND. L. REv. 9, io (2oo8) ("[T]he reasons commonly advanced in favor of enforcing
bargain promises-the facilitation of exchange, the protection of expectations or reliance, or respect
for autonomy-could also be mustered in support of the enforcement of promises traditionally
classified as gratuitous.").
45. See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 20 (1981).
46. But see L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: i, 46
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But Fuller offered one additional substantive argument for the
distinction between bargains and gift promises that is more convincing.
He explained that gift promises, more than bargains, are likely to
constitute "sterile transmission[s]," 47 meaning that gift promises add less
than bargains to the "production of wealth and the division of labor."* In
short, bargains, better than gift promises, contribute to a prosperous
society by moving resources to their highest valued uses.49
Others have contributed additional reasons for the distinction
between gift promises and bargains that nicely complement Fuller's.
Professor Melvin Eisenberg has pointed out that courts lack the capacity
to entertain the potential volume of cases that would flood the courts if
people could sue for breach of gift promises. 0 Further, he underscored
the difficulty of proving the deliberativeness of oral gift promises and the
challenge of sorting out valid from invalid excuses for nonperformance of
such promises." The cost of administering a gift-promise regime, in short,
would likely exceed the benefit.52 In addition, even if Fuller were wrong
about the contribution of gift promises to society because, for example,
gift promises move resources voluntarily from more to less prosperous
citizens, itself a socially beneficial outcome, legal enforcement of these
promises might decrease their number. Promisors might become wary of
making gift promises if they thought that they could not change their
minds.53
In the next section we reinforce the argument that the value of
bargains and the capacity of our institutions to administer them stand out
as the most promising explanations for the consideration doctrine.
YALE L.J. 52, 62 (1936) ("To encourage reliance we must therefore dispense with its proof.").
47. Fuller, supra note 31, at 815 (quoting CLAUDE BUFNOIR, PROPRIT, ET CONTRAT 487 (2d ed.
1924)).
48. Id.; see also HILLMAN, supra note 15, at 25.
49. Melvin Eisenberg asserts that gift promises would lose their symbolic meaning if they were
legally enforceable. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The World of Contract and the World of Gift, 85 CAL.
L. REV. 821, 849 (997).
The world of gift is a world of our better selves, in which affective values like love,
friendship, affection, gratitude, and comradeship are the prime motivating forces. These
values are too important to be enforced by law and would be undermined if the
enforcement of simple, affective donative promises were to be mandated by the law.
Id.
50. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Donative Promises, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1979).
51. See id. at 4-6.
52. Enforcing only written gift promises would alleviate some of these concerns. See supra notes
37-39 and accompanying text.
53. Wessman, supra note 44, at 16 (discussing Eisenberg, supra note 49, at 828). Still others have
contributed enlightened explanations for the bargain-gift promise distinction. See, e.g., FRIED, Supra
note 45; Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of
Contract, 89 YALE L.J. I1261 (1980); Roy Kreitner, The Gift Beyond the Grave: Revisiting The Question
of Consideration, 101 CoLUM. L. REV. 1876 (2001); Richard A. Posner, Gratuitous Promises in
Economics and Law, 63J. LEGAL STUD. 411 (1977).
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C. IS THE BARGAIN THEORY COHERENT?
The bargain theory is neither descriptively nor normatively very
coherent. As Professor Charles Fried pointed out and as the discussion
above intimates, the theory leaves ample room for courts to dodge issues
and for theorists to ponder." Courts sometimes police the adequacy of
consideration despite contract law's freedom-of-contract norm to leave
that issue to the parties." Courts enforce gift promises that induce
reliance or for a benefit already received despite the absence of a
bargain. 6 Courts enforce without consideration contract modifications,
option contracts, waivers, and promises made to charitable institutions. 7
Courts enforce promises even if the return consideration is only an
ephemeral reason for making the promise. 8 Courts manipulate or
dispense with consideration if they believe a gift promise is important
enough to enforce.59 Consideration to support a promise can come from a
party other than the promisee.6 o Theorists offer conflicting moral,
economic, and libertarian theories, among others, to "explain" promise
enforcement.6 1 No wonder Professor Grant Gilmore was moved to
6,
announce the wholesale demise of the bargain theory of consideration.
Notwithstanding Gilmore, we believe that the bargain theory
survives as the best the law can do at line drawing between those
promises that should be legally enforceable and those that should be left
to the promisor's "foro conscientiae."" Despite its malleability,
consideration serves a minimal gatekeeper role, corralling the large
category of gift promises in which the cost of enforcement outweighs the
benefit. Nevertheless, the bargain theory's relative indeterminacy means
that courts can enlarge the category of promises within its ranks if they
54. See FRIED, supra note 45, at 35; see also Randy Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86
COLUM. L. REv. 269 (1986); Wessman, supra note 35.
55. See, e.g., Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 298 N.Y.S.2d 264, 266 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (finding a contract
unconscionable when it specified the sale of a freezer worth $300 to a low-income buyer for $900).
56. FRuED, supra note 45, at 25, 31-32.
57. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-209 (2005) (contract modification); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 87(I) (1981) (option contract); HILLMAN, supra note 15, at 274 (waiver); cf. Allegheny Coll. v. Nat'l
Chautauqua County Bank of Jamestown, 159 N.E. 173, 176 (N.Y. 1927) (charitable institutions).
58. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
59. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
6o. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71(1), (4) ("To constitute consideration, a
performance or a return promise must be bargained for. . . . The performance or return promise may
be given to the promisor or to some other person. It may be given by the promisee or by some other
person.").
61. See generally ROBERT A. HILLMAN, RICHNESS OF CONTRACT LAW (1997).
62. See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT I II n.34 (1974) ("Harner v.
Sidway . . . illustrates . .. that the New York Court of Appeals . . . rejected the so-called bargain theory
of consideration.").
63. Mills v. Wyman, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 207, 208 (1825).
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believe a promise is important and enforcement is administratively
feasible.
Two examples of the latter should suffice. To preserve the flexibility
of contracting parties in the face of changed circumstances, contract law
recognized the importance of enforcing contract modifications that are
not supported by consideration. Courts therefore devised mutual
rescission, waiver, and other theories within the framework of the
consideration doctrine to allow for enforcement of such modifications64
Similarly, contract law began to enforce promises not to revoke offers
(option contracts) in the absence of consideration because of the
importance of options to our economy: "The fact that the option is an
appropriate preliminary step in the conclusion of a socially useful
transaction provides a sufficient substantive basis for enforcement.. . .0"
In short, under the rubric of "consideration," twentieth-century
courts enforced promises that increased society's welfare, interpreted
broadly, and that were capable of judicial administration.6 Lines were
drawn, but courts could adjust them if necessary. In Parts II and III of
this Article, we argue that open source licenses nicely fit in the category
of agreements that consideration doctrine, as it is currently understood,
encompasses. Further, we argue that contract law should enforce such
licenses as contracts.
11. THE PAPER WORLD'S CONCEPTION OF CONTRACTS INCLUDES OPEN
SOURCE LICENSES
A. THE NATURE OF THE OPEN SOURCE MOVEMENT
The notion that sharing software might be a successful technical and
business strategy began somewhat earlier than many might think. In
1955, users of one of IBM's early systems organized a user group called
SHARE in which members exchanged ideas and software. IBM at the
64. See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman, Contract Modification Under the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 68o (1982); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1700 (1976).
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87 cmt. b; see also David Gamage & Allon Kedem,
Commodification and Contract Formation: Placing Consideration Doctrine on Stronger Foundations,
73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1299, 1318-19 (2oo6) ("Since option contracts and guarantee contracts are socially
valuable in substance, any imperfections in form can be ignored. Ironically, whereas these authorities
normally prioritize substance over form, they are willing to accept form over substance for promises
that they recognize as sufficiently valuable."); James D. Gordon 1II, Consideration and the
Commercial-Gift Dichotomy, 44 VAND. L. REV. 283, 292-96 ('99').
66. See Wessman, supra note 44, at 14-15 (observing "the trend in modern contract law to
enforce all commercial promises-even though some are technically gratuitous").
67. See About SHARE, Organization. http://www.share.orglAboutSHARE/Organization/tabid/66
Default.aspx (last visited Nov. 17, 2009) ("In 1955, just two years after the release of IBM's first
computer, a handful of the earliest IT professionals collaborated to form SHARE."); see also Mary
Brandel, 1955: IBM Customers Form the First Computer User Group. CNN.cots, May 5, T999, http://
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time distributed some source code with its hardware and encouraged the
formation of the group because the more utilities that would run on
IBM's hardware, the more attractive its machines became.68
Computer technology has of course changed dramatically since 1955
with the advent of mini-computers and later the PC.6 9 A mass market for
software grew up in response, and vendors protected their software with
a panoply of legal methods that made sharing not simply unlikely but
potentially a breach of contract, misappropriation of trade secrets,
copyright infringement, and/or patent infringement.o
Most place the origin of what is now known as FOSS (free and open
source software) not with SHARE, but substantially later. In the mid-
1980s, Richard Stallman founded the Free Software Foundation (FSF) in
part as a reaction against the rise of business models that relied on
keeping source code proprietary and thus effectively inaccessible to
those who wished to modify or otherwise improve on it and share their
solutions with others." The acronym FOSS accommodates two visions of
the open source movement. Stallman's FSF contends that ethically the
copyright system is "inherently divisive and antisocial" 2 while others in
the open source community view software sharing as an important
development model but compatible with proprietary software.73 Thus, for
www.cnn.comfTECH/computing/9905/o5/1955.idg/index.html ("[SHARE's] main purpose was to stop
reinventing the wheel-at the time, all the 701 users were writing their own utilities and programs.
With the impending release of the 704, they faced the giant task of rewriting or porting all those
programs to a new machine. So from the very first meeting, the group began to share programming
knowledge."); W. David Gardner, SHARE, IBM User Group, To Celebrate 5oth Anniversary,
INFO.WK., Aug. 17, 2005, http://www.informationweek.com/news/showArticle.jhtml?articlelD=1694OOi67
(quoting Robert Rosen, SHARE President, as saying "SHARE and its SHARE library invented the
open source concept.").
68. See generally Michael R. Mattioli, The Impact of Open Source on Pre-Invention Assignment
Contracts, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 207, 223-24 ("[E]arly computer programmers freely exchanged
the programs they wrote. Hardware companies bundled software free of charge with computer
systems, and users were free to copy code and make modifications.").
69. See Maureen A. O'Rourke, The Story of Diamond v. Diehr: Toward Patenting Software, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 199, 199-201 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds.,
2006) (summarizing the evolution of the industry and legal methods to protect software); Ravicher,
supra note 2, T T9-15.
70. See O'Rourke, supra note 69, at 203-18 (discussing the evolution of patent protection for
software); Ravicher, supra note 2, 9-15.
71. See McGowan, supra note 2, at 2605.
72. Id. at 261.
73. Id. at 261-62; see also Davidson & Kumagai, supra note 5, at 125, 133-34 ("There are two
primary factions within the open source community. The first is the 'free software movement.' The
'free software movement' is a philosophical and social movement that aims to change the rights of
software users. .. . The second faction of the open source community is the 'open source movement,'
which promotes the efficiency and better software development model of open source development,
rather than moral or ethical ideals of freedom."); Gonzhlez de Alaiza Cardona, supra note 2, at 583
("[Tihe free software movement justifies the freedoms to distribute and access the source code as a
matter of social fairness. . . . [T~he Open Source Initiative agrees with the superiority of an open
development process, but they consider it compatible with the commercial software companies, that is,
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example, the FSF's GPL contains provisions that require modification
and redistribution of the code under terms that keep both the original
code and derivative works thereof open, while other open source licenses
allow access to source code but do not necessarily place conditions on
modification or redistribution that would enforce the norm of openness.74
Open source software is developed in a dramatically different way
than proprietary code. The open source development model is
collaborative, with large numbers of participants ranging from
professional programmers to hobbyists contributing to any particular
effort." That this development model can be successful is beyond
question. Some of the most widely used, important, and complex
programs are open source, and many companies that traditionally
advocated a proprietary model have embraced open source in one way
or another."
Backing up this collaborative development effort are the licenses
that accompany the code that enforce the community norm of openness.
The licenses do not reject copyright law but instead use the author's
copyright rights in the code to keep it open." The GPL, likely the most
with proprietary software.").
74. Gonzallez de Alaiza Cardona, supra note 2, at 184-85. The major example of an open source
license that does not require openness downstream is the Berkeley Software Distribution (BSD)
license. Id. at 184; see also WEBER, supra note 4, at 20-53 (chronicling the early history of open source
software and discussing the BSD).
75. See Douglas D. McGhee, Free and Open Source Software Licenses: Benefits, Risks, and Steps
Toward Ensuring Compliance, INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J., Nov. 2007, at 5, 5 ("Instead of a small team
of proprietary developers working on a software product, any programmer with access to the Internet
can participate in the development of a FOSS project so long as they agree to make their work
publicly available. The hoped-for result of having many sets of eyes on a body of code is that the final
result will be superior to what a small group of proprietary developers bound by confidentiality
agreements can accomplish."); see also Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and
the New Politics of Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804, 822-25, 869-70 (2o08) ("[O]pen-source
software . . . offers a model of collaborative, distributed innovation that does not rely on the
incentivizing effect of IP rights.").
76. See Gonzalez de Alaiza Cardona, supra note 2, at 16o-62 (listing some major open source
packages including Apache, Firefox, and Linux, and noting that many large companies are supporting
the open source movement); see also Lee, supra note 3, at 53 ("[C]ollaborative OSS projects such as
Linux and Apache demonstrate that a large and complex system of software codes can be built.
maintained, developed, and extended in a non-proprietary setting where developers work in a highly
parallel and relatively unstructured way."); id. at 69-97.
The open source movement has been fairly successful in the development of operating
systems and server application systems that respond directly to the needs of sophisticated
users, but they have been much less successful in developing end-user applications. Casual
observation suggests that [F]OSS is now largely aimed at sophisticated users. This targeting
may be explained by the fact that [F]OSS programmers are seeking recognition from their
peers, who are sophisticated users.
Id. at 95-96 (footnote omitted).
77. See WEBER, supra note 4, at 84 ("[O]pen source developers are some of the most vehement
defenders of intellectual property rights. Rarely do these developers put their software in the public
domain, which means renouncing copyright and allowing anyone to do anything with their work.").
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common FOSS license and the subject of our focus here, is a case in
point. " Much open software is licensed under GPL version two (GPL v
2), first issued in ii." After an extensive revision process, FSF released
GPL version three (GPL v 3) in 200 7.t
The FSF took the position that GPL V 2 was not a contract. In the
words of Eben Moglen, the FSF's attorney:
The word "license" has-... a specific technical meaning in the law of
property. A license is a unilateral permission to use someone else's
property....
A contract, on the other hand, is an exchange of obligations, either
of promises for promises or of promises of future performance for
present performance or payment....
The GPL. .. is a true copyright license: a unilateral permission, in
which no obligations are reciprocally required by the licensor.
Copyright holders of computer programs are given, by the Copyright
Act, exclusive right to copy, modify and redistribute their programs.
The GPL, reduced to its essence, says: "You may copy, modify and
redistribute this software, whether modified or unmodified, freely. But
if you redistribute it, in modified or unmodified form, your permission
extends only to distribution under the terms of this license. If you
violate the terms of this license, all permission is withdrawn."8 '
Richard Stallman has also noted policy reasons why FSF prefers
that copyright law rather than contract law govern the GPL: "[Contract
law] would require every distributor to get a user's formal assent to the
contract before providing a copy. To hand someone a CD without gettin
his signature first would be forbidden. What a pain in the neck!" 2
Additionally, copyright law offers the advantage of injunctive relief and
contract law has worrisome liability rules and privity limitations, the
latter making remote enforcement of the GPL's provisions possibly more
difficult.83
78. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
79. Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, A First Look at General Public License 3.0, COMPUTER & INTERNET
L., Nov. 2007, at 15, 15 ("Stallman released version 2 of the GPL (GPL 2.0) in 1991 after receiving
some input from programmers and legal counsel.").
8o. Id. (describing the revision process); Sapna Kumar & Olaf Koglin, GPL Version 3's DRM and
Patent Clauses under German and US. Law, 2008 COMPUTER L. REv. INT'L (CRI) 33, 33 (noting GPL v
3 was released on June 29, 2007).
81. The GPL is a License, Not a Contract, Which is Why the Sky Isn't Falling, GROKLAW, Dec. 14,
2003, http://www.groklaw.net/article.php?story=200312142io634851.
82. Richard M. Stallman, Don't Let 'Intellectual Property' Twist Your Ethos (June 9, 2oo6),
http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/no-ip-ethos.html.
83. See 17 U.S.C. § 502 (2oo6) (authorizing injunctions in copyright cases); see also Phelps &
Assocs. v. Galloway, 492 F.3d 532, 542-47 (4th Cir. 2007) (discussing injunction requirements in
copyright cases). On privity issues, see McGowan, supra note 2, at 297-98.
GPL may not bind downstream users who take code from someone other than the rights-
holder because persons who encounter license terms that run with the code will not be in
privity with the rights-holder. .. .
The privity concern might not be dispositive in any event. The GPL is a nonexclusive,
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Sapna Kumar has characterized GPL v 2 as a "failed contract,"
because it lacks "a meeting of the minds with regard to consideration."
Although contract law does not require a "meeting of the minds" and
formation issues are analytically distinct from the question of
consideration, Kumar is rightly concerned that software users do not
always have adequate notice of the license to establish the formation of a
contract." Another commentator adds that "the licensee's consideration
is his promise to abide by the copyleft clause," but notes that the user
may not see the terms of use so that no contract is formed." Of course,
these observations do not mean that contract law does not apply to open
source licenses, only that contract law will not enforce licenses without
sufficient notice and assent.
For a time, the FSF insisted, as it had with GPL V 2, that v 3 is not a
contract. However, it deleted language to that effect in the final wording
of GPL v 3." GPL v 3 deals with a number of issues that arose over time
in the licensing of open source software.88 For example, GPL v 3 requires
licensees to license essential patents to downstream users. Kumar states,
It appears most likely that [breach of contract] is how GPLv3 will be
enforced in the U.S. Unlike with GPLv2, a licensee under [v3] has a
number of affirmative obligations, such as providing a license on
essential patents to all downstream users. Such obligations cannot be
enforced by the Copyright Act alone; a state contract action would also
be required.90
Courts, of course, will ultimately determine whether GPL V 2, v 3, or
open source licenses generally are contracts, and results may vary
depending on jurisdiction and court. In Germany, where consideration is
not required for a contract to be enforceable, courts treat GPL v 2 as
"both a contract and license."9' The most important U.S. case to date is
transferable license.... One might view distribution of GPL code as simply a transfer
within the terms of a license.
Id. (footnote omitted)).
84. Kumar, supra note 2, at 16.
85. Id. at 17-19.
86. Gonzllez de Alaiza Cardona, supra note 2, at 194, 200 ("The vulnerabilities of the... GPL
licensing method are: (i) the recipient of the software may not receive a notice of the license before
delivery, and (2) no signature or other manifestation of assent is generally required. Moreover ... the
recipient may not get a copy, physical or digital, of the ... GPL license." (footnote omitted)).
87. RAYMOND T. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY §I0:I9 (4th ed. 2009) ("GPL 3.0
retains the general tone that the transactions it governs directly are noncontractual., although in the
final draft after a lengthy revision process, the drafters deleted language specifying that the license was
not a contract.").
88. See Gomulkiewicz, supra note 79, at i5-20.
89. Id. at 17-19; Kumar & Koglin, supra note 8o, at 33, 35-37 (discussing GPL V 3's patent
provisions).
90. Kumar & Koglin, supra note 8o.
91. Id. at 33-34.
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Jacobsen v. Katzer, which addressed not the GPL but another open
source license called the Artistic License. 92
In Jacobsen, the defendant failed to comply with a number of
provisions of the Artistic License:
Specifically, [Katzer's] software did not include (i) the author' [sic]
names, (2) .. . copyright notices, (3) references to the COPYING file
[which contains the Artistic License], (4) an identification of
[Jacobsen] as the original source of the definition files, and (5) a
description of how the files or computer code had been changed from
the original source code. The [Katzer] software also changed various
computer file names... without providing a reference to the
original . . . files or information on where to get the Standard Version."
The district court held that Jacobsen's cause of action was for
breach of contract not copyright infringement, holding that the terms
Katzer violated were not limitations on the scope of the license (and thus
not remediable under copyright law), but contractual in nature.94
The Federal Circuit's decision on appeal is noteworthy for two
reasons: (i) its commentary on consideration, and (2) its holding that
demonstrates the utility of both contract and copyright law in enforcing
open source licenses. We concentrate here on the first and turn to the
second in Part III below. With respect to consideration, the court stated:
Traditionally, copyright owners sold their copyrighted material in
exchange for money. The lack of money changing hands in open source
licensing should not be presumed to mean that there is no economic
consideration, however. There are substantial benefits, including
economic benefits, to the creation and distribution of copyrighted
works under public licenses that range far beyond traditional license
royalties. For example, program creators may generate market share
for their programs by providing certain components free of charge.
Similarly, a programmer or company may increase its national or
international reputation by incubating open source projects.
Improvement to a product can come rapidly and free of charge from an
expert not even known to the copyright holder."
The court thus appeared to recognize that the Artistic License was
supported by consideration and a contract. In the next section, we
support and supplement the reasons for the Jacobsen court's conclusion
that open source licenses are contracts.
92. 535 F-3d 1373, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2oo8).
93. Id. at 1376-77-
94. Id. at 1376.
95. Id. at 1379 ("The Eleventh Circuit has recognized the economic motives inherent in public
licenses, even where profit is not immediate. See Planetary Motion, Inc. v. Techsplosion, Inc., 261 F.3d
188, 12oo (1 ith Cir. 2001) (Program creator 'derived value from the distribution [under a public
license] because he was able to improve his Software based on suggestions sent by end-users. . . . It is
logical that as the Software improved, more end-users used his Software, thereby increasing [the
programmer's] recognition in his profession and the likelihood that the Software would be improved
even further.')." (alterations in original) (quoting Planetary Motion, 263 F.3d at 1200)).
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B. MosT OPEN SOURCE LICENSES ARE CONTRACTS
We believe that the Jacobsen court's decision is correct. We also
think that although there are a range of open source licenses, most
contain terms that should place them within contract law's domain and
lack of consideration should not prevent these licenses from being
treated as contracts. Here we clarify and elaborate on the type of terms
that make open source license contracts. For example, and most
obviously, contract law applies to the license if a licensee pays for the
software or agrees to pay for maintenance or integration services.'
Contract law should also apply if the licensor and licensee exchange
source code. These transactions mirror the twentieth-century exchange
of hard goods for money or other consideration.
More challenging are open source licenses that do not contemplate
any of the above exchanges, but simply authorize licensees to transfer,
copy, or modify the software, subject to certain conditions. Such "terms
of use" often include (and we focus on) the "copyleft" and "same terms"
provisions discussed earlier." These terms should also constitute
consideration under the bargain theory. Recall that general contract law
finds consideration if a condition constitutes more than is necessary to
transfer a gift.99 Terms of use, such as "copyleft" and "same terms," are
not necessary to convey software and therefore constitute consideration
under general contract law if at least part of the vendor's motive
(however insubstantial), judged objectively, is to extract agreement to
the terms of use." Vendors in the open source movement make no
secret about their desire to create a new paradigm of openness, to
enhance the freedom and capabilities of software users, to foster
innovation, and to create public acceptance and familiarity with their
intellectual property framework.'0 ' The motive to further one or more of
96. See generally Matthew D. Stein, Rethinking UCITA: Lessons from the Open Source
Movement, 58 ME. L. REV. 157 (2oo6) (discussing the range of licenses). As of 2oo6, there were "nearly
sixty separate licenses approved by the Open Source Initiative." Id. at 196.
97. See supra Part I.A.
98. See supra notes 6-7, 13 and accompanying text.
99. See supra Part I.A; see also Affiliated Enters., Inc. v. Waller, 5 A.2d 257, 259-60 (Del. 1939)
(distinguishing "mere incidental or friendly detriments, not intended as ingredients of a bargain" from
"bargained for consideration"); Plowman v. Indian Ref. Co., 20 F. Supp. 1, 5 (E.D. Ill. 1937) (retired
employees' trip to employer's office to receive their pay not consideration).
ioo. For a discussion of the position that open source software demands special legal treatment,
see Jean Braucher, New Basics: Twelve Principles for Fair Commerce in Mass-Market Software and
Other Digital Products, in CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE 'INFORMATION ECONOMY' 177
(Jane K. Winn ed., 2oo6), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=730907. For another view, see Ieuan G.
Mahoney & Edward J. Naughton, Open Source Software Monetized: Out of the Bazaar and into Big
Business, COMPUTER & INTERNET L., Oct. 2004, at I,i. "The open source movement may have been born
as a political ideology, a communitarian alternative to corporate profit-seeking and the 'privatization'
of technical innovation, but it has been transformed into a commercial enterprise." Id.
rol. See supra notes 71-74, 77 and accompanying text.
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these goals, without more, should be sufficient to satisfy the bargain
requirement. But often there is more. A licensor may benefit indirectly,
for example, by entering lucrative service and update contracts or by
gaining publicity for other more entrepreneurial projects.0 2 Even without
such benefits, collaborators work in a "'gift culture' in which members
compete for status by giving things away."" Contract law (like the
court's ruling in Jacobsen) long has recognized that a motive to increase
one's standing as opposed to pure altruism may be sufficient to constitute
consideration.'o 4Further, developers learn state-of-the-art technology and
gain prestige by participating in the open source movement.o' Thus,
consideration supports open source software license grants under
traditional contract law.Io6
But what of Moglen's objection that an open source license is no
different from, for example, an invitation (license) to visit an owner's
land?" The implication of this observation is that even if the invitation
includes restrictions concerning, for example, the time of the visit or
permitted uses of the land, the restrictions simply define and narrow the
scope of the license. Such restrictions should not be treated as a contract
if a contract requires a promisor to extract something from the promisee.
Open source licenses that contain "copyleft" or "same terms"
restrictions, however, go beyond simply defining the boundaries of the
license. If the landowner's invitation required the invitee to use
knowledge gained by the visit in a special way or restricted the transfer
of that knowledge to a third party, then the license to visit the land would
constitute a bargain and a contract under traditional contract law.
102. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS, § I.o6 cmt. d (Proposed
Final Draft Mar. 2009) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES].
103. Lee, supra note 3, at 54 (quoting McGowan, supra note 2, at 262).
104. See supra note 95; see also Allegheny Coll. v. Nat'l Chautauqua County Bank of Jamestown,
159 N.E. 173, 176 (N.Y. 1927) (discussed supra notes 20-23, 27, 57, 59 and accompanying text).
105. wEBER, supra note 4, at 196.
io6. See, e.g., Wayne R. Barnes, Rethinking Spyware: Questioning the Propriety of Contractual
Consent to Online Surveillance, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1545, 1597 (2oo6) ("[B]y clicking that she has
accepted [the] EULA from KaZaa, bundled with [spyware], the user has ostensibly struck a bargain.
She will receive a program she sought for 'free.' Of course, '[i]n a sense, [she] is paying, but the coin is
privacy, not money."' (first, second, and third emphases added) (quoting Paul M. Schwartz, Property,
Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2055, 2072 (2004))); Stein supra note 96, at 194 ("The
GPL . . .is not just a mere permission. It imposes obligations upon licensees that must be accepted in
order to exercise the rights granted in the license.... Given these obligations, many have suggested
that the GPL would likely be interpreted as a contract, not a bare license." (footnote omitted)).
Additional helpful commentary includes Lawrence Lessig, The Limits in Open Code: Regulatory
Standards and the Future of the Net, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 759 (999); Margaret J. Radin & R. Polk
Wagner, The Myth of Private Ordering: Rediscovering Legal Realism in Cyberspace, 73 Cmi.-KENT L.
REV. I1295 (1998); and Jonathan Zittrain, Normative Principles for Evaluating Free and Proprietary
Software, 7' U. CHI. L. REv. 265 (2004).
107. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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Moreover, as we developed in Part I, contract law has evolved to
find consideration when enforcement of promises would increase
society's welfare and the enforcement is capable of judicial
administration.' The social value of the FOSS movement is
unquestionable. We have already noted that many of the most important
and complex software programs are open source and private companies
have embraced the model." Further, without doubt open source has
achieved its goal of fostering innovation that makes more and more
programs available to the public, often without charge."0 In addition, the
open source philosophy has spread to other frameworks, increasing
people's "access to knowledge" in a wide variety of settings."' Finally,
the collaborative model arguably promotes better quality and reliable
software in large part because skilled participants have both a
commitment to the enterprise and often the luxury of ample spare time
to devote to software development"' without fear of a lawsuit based on
copyright or another intellectual property cause of action."'
Not only does open source benefit society, but courts should have
little difficulty applying a contractual framework to open source licenses.
We have already shown that open source meets the technical
requirements of a bargain. We now set forth another example of how
open source nicely lends itself to a contract-law analysis.
Even if an open source license is supported by consideration and the
licensee has reasonable notice of the terms, a licensor might argue for
two reasons that there is no binding contract until the licensee modifies
or distributes the software. First, a court might find that the contract
lo8. See supra note 66 and accompanying text; see also Wessman, supra note 44, at 14 (observing
"the trend in modern contract law to enforce all commercial promises-even though some are
technically gratuitous").
1o9. See supra note 76 and accompanying text; see also Open Source Initiative. Open Standards
Requirements for Software-Rationale (Sept. 19, 2oo6), http://www.opensource.org/osr-rationale ("As
the Internet shows so clearly, there is great social, technical, and financial benefit that comes from
massive interoperability.") [hereinafter Open Source Initiative].
ilo. See generally supra note 76 and accompanying text.
iii. See, e.g., Kapczynski, supra note 75 (situating the open source software movement within a
wider "access to knowledge" movement and tracing the open source software regime as a reaction to
the strength of intellectual property rights); see also Mark J. Jakiela, Abstract, http://law.wustLedu/crie/
index.asp?id=6381 (last visited Nov. I7, 2009) (websites incorporate contributions to content such as
T-shirt graphic design); Charles McManis, Abstract, Facilitated Access and Benefit-Sharing under the
new FAO Treaty: The Interface of Open Source and Proprietary Agricultural Innovation, http://
law.wustl.edu/crie/index.asp?id=6381 (last visited Nov. 17, 2009) (international treaty dealing with
plant genetics parallels open source and proprietary software interface); Keith Sawyer, Abstract,
http://law.wustl.edu/crie/index.asp?id=6381 (last visited Nov. 17, 2009) (discussing "collaborative
webs").
112. ERIC S. RAYMOND, THE CATHEDRAL AND THE BAZAAR 54 (2001) ("[T]he closed-source world
cannot win an evolutionary arms race with open-source communities that can put orders of magnitude
more skilled time into a problem"); J. T. Westermeier, Open Source Software, in PRACTICING LAW
INSTITUTE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 425, 427-40 (2004).
113. Open Source Initiative, supra note 109.
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lacks mutuality of obligation-the licensee can choose not to modify or
distribute the software and therefore have no obligation under the
license. Agreements that do not evidence a commitment from both
parties are not enforceable as contracts."4 Second, a court might
determine that the licensor made an offer for a unilateral contract-"if
you modify or distribute the software, I promise not to sue you for
infringement provided you abide by the restrictions.""5 The licensee has
not accepted the offer until the licensee modifies or distributes the
software." 6
The better view, however, is that a contract is formed when a
licensee acquires the software, such as by downloading it, even if the
licensee does not have to manifest assent to the restrictions and even
before the licensee modifies or distributes the software. The act of
acquiring the software (assuming the licensee has knowledge of the
restrictions) constitutes an implied-in-fact acceptance of the terms of
use." 7 At that point, the licensee has made a commitment that narrows its
freedom, namely to abide by the restrictions if it modifies or distributes
the downloaded software." 8
III. OPEN SOURCE LICENSES SHOULD BE TREATED AS CONTRACTS
As we have discussed, under the technical rules of consideration
doctrine as it has developed, most open source licenses are supported by
consideration. Here we turn to broader policy questions and argue that
open source licenses nicely fit into the category of promises that contract
law should enforce.
In short, clarifying the law applicable to open source licenses
through enforcement of the licenses as contracts should help to facilitate
and encourage open source development. As we noted in Part II, no one
should dispute the social utility of open source software development."'
As a practical matter, however, as vendors market more and more open
14. See, e.g., De Los Santos v. Great W. Sugar Co., 348 N.W.2d 842, 845 (Neb. 1984) (voiding
unexecuted portion of beet-hauling contract because sugar company was not required to use hauler's
services and therefore could effectively terminate the contract whenever it wanted).
115. This is essentially the strategy of the GPL, which states that the copyholder is
not required to accept this License in order to receive or run a copy of the
Program... . However, nothing other than this License grants you permission to propagate
or modify any covered work. These actions infringe copyright if you do not accept this
License. Therefore, by modifying or propagating a covered work, you indicate your
acceptance of this License to do so.
GNU Version 3, supra note 8, § 9.
i16. See HILLMAN, supra note 15, at 55-57 (discussing unilateral contract).
117. See id. at 43-45 (discussing acceptance).
I18. If the court finds that the license is an enforceable contract even before the licensee modifies
or transfers the software, then the licensee would have warranty rights unless those were disclaimed.
119. See supra notes lo9-13 and accompanying text.
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source software commercially, disputes will arise. By providing a
framework for adjudication that respects the structure of the movement
and (as we will shortly show) the importance of intellectual property law
to it, contract law provides a measure of certainty that will prevent the
inevitable disputes from undermining the movement.
We have noted that some open source proponents adamantly
oppose the contract conception in part because of fears about formation
requirements, privity rules, liability for defective software, and the lack
of injunctive relief (in contrast to copyright law)." We have problems
understanding these fears.
First, the benefits of a contractual framework for open source
distributors outweigh these concerns even if they were well founded. If
open source licenses were not contracts and licensors could not disclaim
liability contractually, licensors would be more likely to be liable for
defective software or intellectual property infringement under theories
based on misrepresentation, estoppel, or the like."' In fact, under a
contract model, even without a disclaimer, many open source
collaborators are not likely to be liable for breach of warranty such as
UCC section 2-314's implied warranty of merchantability2 2 that applies
to "professional[s] in business."' 23 Hobbyists, by definition, are not in the
software business and do not "deal in software of the kind transferred"'"
or hold themselves out "by occupation as having knowledge or skill
peculiar to the [software]."' The hobbyist's "occupation," again by
definition, is not engineering the software. Further, vendors of open
source software that do not qualify as hobbyists often should have little
to fear from contract warranty law because the nature of open source
software development-multiple collaborators who often exchange code
of software still in development-means that users should reasonably
expect that the licensor is transferring the software "as is."'"' Indeed,
UCC section 2-316(3)(c) upholds disclaimers of implied warranties based
on "course of dealing or course of performance or usage of trade.""' An
open source provider could certainly argue that the relevant usage of
trade supports the lack of an implied quality warranty.
Moreover, the fears of contract opponents are not well founded.
Although under current practices open source licenses rarely satisfy the
120. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
121. Current law is unclear. See, e.g., Herkko Hietanen, A License or a Contract; Analyzing the
Nature of Creative Commons Licenses, NORDIC INTELL. L. REV. (forthcoming), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractlid=1029366.
122. U.C.C. § 2-314 (2005).
123. Id. § 2-104(1) cmt. 2.
124. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 102, § 303(a).
125. U.C.C. § 2-104(I) (emphasis added).
126. See ALT PRINCIPLEs, supra note 102, at 153-63.
127. U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(c).
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notice and formation requirement of contract-formation law (that
Stallman rather improvidently considers a "pain in the neck")," these
would not be difficult to satisfy and would protect distributors and users
alike. Courts generally approve of the clickwrap formation process for
software downloads that requires for enforcement that a licensee click "I
agree" at the end of or adjacent to an e-standard form before completing
a transaction.I' Under current technology, moving to clickwrap should
not prove costly to open source transactors, nor would attaching terms of
use to packaged software. 30
Another important reason for recognizing open source licenses as
contracts is that contract and intellectual property law (we focus on
copyright here) work well together in supporting the FOSS model and
provide a useful complement of remedies for failing to comply with a
license. In fact, with this complement of remedies, open source licensors
should have no misgivings about the availability of injunctive relief or
worry about the privity problems of contract law.
Consider first the initial licensee who obtains the code directly from
an open source provider. Assume that the licensee fails to comply with a
term of the agreement. Depending on the nature of the term, the open
source provider may have a cause of action for infringement, breach of
contract, or both.
To determine the appropriate cause of action, a court must
determine whether a provision constitutes a pure condition defining the
scope of the license, a mere promise (also called a covenant), or both
(called a promissory condition).' 3' Assume, for example, that a license
contained a provision that granted the licensee the right to distribute the
code further only if the licensee included copyleft terms in its license
agreement. If the term is drafted as a pure condition ("you can distribute
the software provided that you reveal the source code") but the licensee
ignores the term and distributes the software without revealing the
source code, the licensee has exceeded the scope of the license, and the
licensor may sue for infringement.'32 If the licensee also promises to abide
by the copyleft term ("licensee promises to distribute the software only
upon revealing the source code") but ignores the term and distributes the
software without revealing the source code, the licensor may also sue for
breach of contract unless intellectual property law would preempt the
claim.' 33 Of course, the licensor cannot receive a double recovery.'34 If,
128. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
129. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 102, at 110-21.
13o. Id. § 2.02 cmt. f.
131. Id. § 3.11 cmt. b (setting forth the general rules and sources).
132. Id.
133. Preemption law is complex. For a summary, see id. § 1.09. we do not here address the
preemption of contract claims because it is tangential to the main point-i.e., that the licensor is able
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instead, the licensee simply breaches a promise not involving an
intellectual property right, the cause of action is for breach of contract."'
State law determines whether a contractual provision is a pure
condition, a promissory condition, or a mere promise.) For example,
some states consider use of the words "provided that" in a license as
making the license conditional on compliance with the proviso."' Under
this framework, licensors have nothing to fear from contract law, but
instead should prefer its application because it allows them to draft
agreements that enhance the probability that they can seek redress under
intellectual property law.3 8 This, in turn, increases the odds that they can
obtain injunctive relief as well as other intellectual property remedies.
Consider now the remote licensee who receives the software from
the initial licensee. Again assume that the initial license contained a
to pursue intellectual property remedies if the license fails to satisfy a condition.
134. HILLMAN, supra note 15, at 134.
135. ALI PRINCIPLEs, supra note 102, § 3.11 cmt. b.
136. Courts may look to a variety of factors including the language of the license, course of
performance, course of dealing, usage of trade, other extrinsic evidence, and the placement of the term
in the license. The Jacobsen court's discussion, which looks to the language of the agreement and the
structure of the transaction, is not atypical:
The Artistic License states on its face that the document creates conditions: "The intent
of this document is to state the conditions under which a Package may be copied."
(Emphasis added.) The Artistic License also uses the traditional language of conditions by
noting that the rights to copy, modify, and distribute are granted "provided that" the
conditions are met. Under California contract law, "provided that" typically denotes a
condition.
The conditions set forth in the Artistic License are vital to enable the copyright holder to
retain the ability to benefit from the work of downstream users. By requiring that users who
modify or distribute the copyrighted material retain the reference to the original source
files, downstream users are directed to Jacobsen's website. Thus, downstream users know
about the collaborative effort to improve and expand the SourceForge project once they
learn of the "upstream" project from a "downstream" distribution, and they may join in that
effort.
The District Court interpreted the Artistic License to permit a user to "modify the
material in any way" and did not find that any of the "provided that" limitations in the
Artistic License served to limit this grant. The District Court's interpretation of the
conditions of the Artistic License does not credit the explicit restrictions in the license that
govern a downloader's right to modify and distribute the copyrighted work. The copyright
holder here expressly stated the terms upon which the right to modify and distribute the
material depended and invited direct contact if a downloader wished to negotiate other
terms. These restrictions were both clear and necessary to accomplish the objectives of the
open source licensing collaboration, including economic benefit.
Jacobson v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citation omitted); see also Sun Microsystems,
Inc. v, Microsoft Corp., 81 F. Supp. 2d 1o26, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (assessing the language and
structure of an agreement to decide the question).
137. Jacobson, 535 F.3d at 1381.
138. See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Conditions and Covenants in License Contracts: Tales frorn a
Test of the Artistic License, 17 TEX. INTELL. PRP L.J. 335, 347-60 (2009), for a full discussion of the
distinction between a condition and a covenant, as well as a consideration of whether there are any
limits to making terms conditions.
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condition that granted the initial licensee the right to distribute the code
further only if the initial licensee included copyleft terms in its license
agreement. The initial licensee fails to include the copyleft terms and its
transferee, the remote licensee, further distributes the code. The original
licensor may sue the remote licensee for infringement because the
distribution to it (and license to it to distribute further) was
unauthorized. When the initial licensee failed to comply with the copyleft
condition, it exceeded the scope of its license. The initial licensee's
distribution without the copyleft terms therefore constituted
infringement. The remote licensee, albeit innocent, has no license from
the original licensor and no effective license from the initial licensee to
distribute the code. The remote licensee's distribution is therefore also
infringing. Notwithstanding the lack of privity between the original open
source licensor and the remote licensee, the licensor does indeed have
intellectual property remedies available to it because of the infringement.
Thus, intellectual property law, working together with contract law,
results in a legal system that benefits the parties as well as society. A
contract framework clarifies rights and duties, protects the interests of
both parties, and increases transactional certainty and security. Contract
law therefore facilitates and enhances the open source movement that
has been enormously instrumental in the successful development of
software.
CONCLUSION
Our fast-paced age of electronic agreements -ostensibly governing
transactions as diverse as downloading software, ordering goods, and
engaging in collaborative development projects-raises questions
regarding the suitability of contract law as the appropriate legal
framework for these transactions. While these questions arise in many
settings, we focused here on the FOSS movement because of the
maturity and success of its model and the ubiquity of its software. We
explored in particular whether open source licenses are supported by
consideration, and argued that they are, and that open source licenses
are contracts. We further argued that a contractual framework working
in tandem with the intellectual property laws is the appropriate legal
structure to govern FOSS transactions. Our discussion holds implications
for the understanding of consideration doctrine and contract law
generally outside of the FOSS example and, indeed, for collaborative
development and electronic agreements generally. In sum, the
malleability of the bargain theory means that contract law can rise to the
occasion of important technological and social changes and supply a
superior legal framework.
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